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In 2017, Springer's  The Law and Philosophy Library1 was expanded by a next
work  in the philosophy  of law  which  focuses  on the theoretical  research
of a legal  personhood  in the context  of chosen  entities.  The topic  of legal
personhood  is  discussed  in a highly  theoretical  way  which  adds  a huge
potential  to the book itself.  Especially  since  animals,  artificial  intelligence
(AI) and the unborn shall form the core of the research. However, the result
remains  slightly  behind  its  potential.  This  review  will  describe  briefly
the content of the book selected into three parts (see below) and evaluate
these parts separately following the individual descriptions.
Discussion  of the legal  personhood  in the selected  context  is  crucial
when considering  the question of an AI  in the area  of law.  Nowadays,  AI
represents a significant challenge to the law because of the multiple options
of its operation. For example, considering its role in copyright, an AI might
be  a principal  element  in the chain  of creating  the works.  Following  that,
some  part  of  the doctrine  tries  to understand  the AI  as an author.
The problem is that the understanding of the AI is still prevailing in its own
object-oriented  form.  However,  the role  of an AI  as a subject  of legal
* The review  was  written  within  the project  PrF/08/2018:  “Conceptualization  of the Artificial
Intelligence”.
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relationships –  considering  development  of  its  capabilities  and
exploitation –  is  not  anymore  just  wishful  thinking.2 Therefore  it  is
necessary to examine the most basic principles and concepts in the context
of an AI, including legal personhood.
The book  itself  consists  of ten  chapters  by various  authors  and  is
logically divided into three parts.  Part One conceptualizes the legal person
and  personhood  per  se,  so  that  it  establishes  a theoretical  background
of the book.  Part Two applies  this  theoretical  concept  of legal personhood
to the non-personal subjects of law, such as animals, things and “machines”.
This part represents a more practical part of the book and its most valuable
section trying to answer some important normative questions. Finally, Part
Three discusses  legal  personhood  in the view  of bioethics  and  biolaw.
In general,  this  part  discusses  the depersonalization  and  extraction
of personhood  from  the human  nature  on the one  hand  and  on the other
hand it highlights the role of human rights. As a result, the book provides
a unique  and  global  assessment  of legal  personhood.  Moreover,  each
chapter is followed by a special list of references which is very beneficial for
the narrow  focus  and  better  insight  to authors'  researches,  instead
of the final list of references common to all the chapters.
As it was stated before, Part One, “Identifying the Legal Person”, discusses
legal  personhood  purely  in its  theoretical  sense  and  attempts  to explain
a historical  context  and  background  of the legal  personhood  idea.
The development  of the concept  and  its  understanding  are  described
in a very detailed way.3 This part also refers to fundamental international
documents  on human  rights  and  reflects  the biological  and  ideological,
as well  as philosophical  meaning  of personality,  personhood  and  other
related terms.  The first  chapter,  Brożek:  “The Troublesome ‘Person’”,  highly
relies on Engelhardt's position distinguishing people and persons.4 Brożek
strictly points out the criterion of humanity, consciousness and psychology
when  dealing  with  the legal  personhood.5 The second  chapter,  Naffine:
2 The author  of this  review  is  dealing  with  the artificial  intelligence  as a technological
challenge  to copyright  where  an AI  is  analysed  in a context  of copyright  with  emphasis
on its possible authorship of copyrighted works. For an AI as an author of such works, it is
needed  in the first  instance  to shift  from  its  position  as pure  object  of legal  relationship
to the position  of subject.  However,  such  shift  is  dependent  on granting  the (un)limited
legal personhood to the AI.
3 See especially p. 4–6 of the book.
4 See p. 3 of the book.
5 See p. 8 et seq. of the book.
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“Legal Persons as Abstractions: The Extrapolation of Persons from the Male Case”,
does  not  deny any  of  previous  atatements  and broadens  the knowledge
with  placing  the person  to the structure  of the legal  relationship
as an analytical  unit  of the  subject  position.6 Naffine  discusses  the legal
fiction of personhood7 and notices that individuals tend to be understood
as mental  and  physical  units.8 Following  that,  it  could  be  a question
of whether the model of universal  personhood is  enough, or not,  because
of the role  of gender.9 Finally,  the  third  chapter,  Lindroos-Hovinheimo:
“Private  Selves –  An Analysis  of Legal  Individualism”,  concentrates
on the position  of legal  personhood  within  the legal  setting  of EU  law,
emphasising  the individuality  and  privacy  issues.  Lindroos-Hovinheimo
divides the understanding of legal personhood into two groups, as a legal
artifice  and  an ontological  God-given  nature.10 In this  context,  legal
personhood is connected to the area of privacy and personal data, and with
the relation to Solove’s taxonomy of privacy it is analysed there.11 This EU-
-centric part brings out the inherent connection of privacy and personality;
establishing  their  relevancy  and  need  the for  further  analysis
as the requirement for the legal subjectivity.12
The theoretical  determination  of personality  and  legal  personhood
in this  part  of the book  is  indeed  brilliantly  done.  It  perfectly  helps
to understand  the discussed  matter  in a clear  and  concise  manner.  There
could only be just one objection and it lies in better linking between theory
and  practice.  This  shortcoming  may  either  be  caused  by the form
of the book, or by the highly philosophical conception of the chapters.
Part  Two,  “Persons,  Animals  and Machines”,  forms the core of the book
as a practice-oriented discussion of legal personhood in the case of persons,
animals  and  machines  in three  selected  chapters.  This  part  starts  with
analyzing  the importance  of the legal  systems.  The first  chapter,
Pietrzykowski: “The Idea of Non-personal Subjects of Law”, is based on reflection
over  purpose  of the legal  systems.  These  systems  have  been  constructed
as exclusively human creations and though they might still serve solely for
6 See p. 16 of the book.
7 See p. 16 et seq. of the book.
8 See p. 20 of the book.
9 See p. 25 of the book.
10 See p. 30 of the book.
11 See p. 32 et seq. of the book.
12 See p. 44 of the book.
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the humans.13 Following  that,  the idea  of non-personal  subjecthood  is
described  within  the discussion  of the traditional  dualism  of persons
(personhood) and things (thinghood) as well as their place in more or less
complex legal  relationship.14 When talking about that,  the personhood is
sometimes  being  divided  into  personhood  of human  beings  and  juristic
entities.15 Furthermore,  an effort  is  made  to explain  animal  personhood
in the context  of human  rights  as well,16 or the  idea  of deriving  the legal
personhood from the ability to feel and suffer which could help to recognize
the personal  and  non-personal  subjects  of law.17 This  chapter  ends  with
recommendations,  controversies  and  warnings  of granting  the legal
personhood  to some  entity,  which  is  not  a living  human  being,  without
proper  analysis.18 Next  chapter,  Kurki: “Why  Things  Can  Hold  Rights:
Reconceptualizing  the Legal  Person”,  focuses  on an analysis  of right-holding
persons,  and  the development  of such  a concept.19 There  is  an emphasis
on Western  jurisdictions  regarding  the fundamentals  of paradigmatic
natural  persons,20 the duties  of legal  persons,  and  their  capacity  to hold
rights.21 The main  idea  of this  chapter  is  that  the problem  lies  not
in the unacceptability of granting the legal personhood to other entities but
rather  in the unimaginability  of such  a shift  for  many  jurists.  It  is  done
by underlining  the role  of consciousness  while  there  is  a plethora
of research indicating non-human animals can be conscious.22 The situation
is  compared  to slaves  and  their  social  role  in history  when  the law
established a special category for them.23 This part of the book is concluded
with  the chapter,  Michalczak: “Animals’  Race  Against  the Machines”,  where
the idea  of personhood  for  an AI  is  evaluated.  Ethical  questions  are
thoroughly  described24 as well  as the apparent  resemblance  between  AI's
and an undeveloped child's intelligence, whereby brain activity is mooted
13 See p. 49 of the book.
14 See p. 51 et seq. of the book.
15 See p. 54 of the book.
16 See p. 57 et seq. of the book.
17 See p. 58 of the book.
18 See p. 60 et seq. of the book.
19 See p. 71 of the book.
20 See p. 74 of the book.
21 See p. 82 of the book.
22 See p. 80 of the book.
23 Ibid.
24 See p. 92 et seq. of the book.
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as a relevant  criterion  for  granting  of personhood  to AI.25 There  is  also
established a parallel between animals and AI through the conceptual and
pragmatic  argument  which  highlights  the impossibility  of animals  to  be
granted with the legal personhood.26 Following that,  the legal subjectivity
of software agents is analysed in the same way.27 The chapter is concluded
by describing  the wartime  and  peacetime  (trading)  scenarios  of AI
subjectivization.28
This  part  should  have  been  the most  valuable  part  of the book.
Nevertheless,  I  find  it  quite  vague  and  half-empty  when  considering
the possible  extent  of discussed  topic;  especially  in the part  dealing  with
the AI.  While  the question  of personhood  is  adequately  analysed  as it
relates  to persons  and  animals,  the AI  problematics  not  so  much.
The arguments  discussing  the subjectivization  of AI  are  well  structured.
However, there is missing further differentiation of AI’s legal personhood,
its  limitations and discussion  on the needs for  the shift  of comprehension
that is required given the growing influence and importance of AI. When
analysing  the legal  personhood  of AI,  it  is  not  enough  to focus  only
on ethical problems. It requires analysis of the fundamentals of personhood
and  their  application  to AI.  The next  problem  lies  with  the conclusions
of the chapters which are very broad and lack further elaboration of related
ideas.
Part Three, “Humanity, Personhood and Bioethics”, summarizes the theory
of legal personhood and argues the question of legal personhood in the case
of non-personal  entities  in a view of bioethics,  biolaw  and other  ethically
problematic  disciplines.  The chapter,  Palazzani:  “Person  and  Human  Being
in Bioethics and Biolaw”,  highlights the role of bioethics and “personism”29.
It shows  the utilitarian  and  libertarian  theory  of personality  and  their
importance.30 Palazzani  states  the personhood  as the  real  condition  for
existence  based on the ontological  argument of sensitivity,  rationality and
will of the individuals.31 Following chapter,  Silva: “From Human to Person:
Detaching Personhood from Human Nature”, appeals to human nature and its
25 See p. 94 of the book.
26 See p. 94 et seq. of the book.
27 See p. 96 et seq. of the book.
28 See p. 99 et seq. of the book.
29 See p. 105 of the book.
30 See p. 106 et seq. of the book.
31 See p. 110 of the book.
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crucial role. Silva here states that such nature can never be abound although
there  are  apparent  expanding  efforts.32 The chapter  warns  of the dangers
of depersonalisation  and  highlights  the purpose  of the biological
constitution  and  equity  in that  sense  as possible  clues  for  assessment.33
Next, there is the chapter  Barbosa-Fohrmann et al.: “Are Human Beings with
Extreme  Mental  Disabilities  and  Animals  Comparable?  An Account
of Personality”.  This  chapter  is  focused  on the description  of how
the personal  identity  is  created.34 At this  point,  the role  of Kant’s idea
of substantial  self  is  criticized.35 Barbosa-Fohrmann et al.  are also dealing
with  vulnerability  as a fundamental  feature  of humanity  when  talking
about differences between humanity and animality.36 Finally,  the chapter,
Bielska-Brodziak et al.: “Is Sex Essential for Personhood? Being ‘Halfway Between
Female and Male’ From the Perspective of Polish Law”,  discusses the question
of gender and its role in the question of legal personhood. Bielska-Brodziak
et al.  analyse  the question  of sex  from  the biological  and  legal  point
of view.37 The determination  of the biological  sex  is  described  with
a plethora of links to literature.38 It  is  stated that  determination of gender
in a birth certificate  could be sometimes problematic,  especially  for  those
who  suffer  from  gender  dysphoria  or similar  conditions.39 By way
of contrast  Bielska-Brodziak  et al.  also  present  the possible  pitfalls
the absence of a birth certificate would present.40
This  last  part  of the book  highlights  ethical  problems  and  appeals
to humanity.  Concerning  that,  there  is  nothing  to reproach  because
expanding  the impact  of legal  personhood  necessarily  has  ethical
connotations. Still,  this area could be considered more broadly. There are
a lot  of examples  used  in this  part  but  only  from  the human  or animal
kingdom, while excluding the area of an AI (and machines). Yet, it is an AI
that is so controversial and could serve as a clear example of whether it is
right  or wrong to grant  legal  personhood to something  or somebody else
than mankind. Furthermore, the final chapter feels out of place with the rest
32 See p. 114 et seq. of the book.
33 See p. 119 of the book.
34 See p. 128 of the book.
35 See p. 136 of the book.
36 See p. 132 of the book.
37 See p. 143 et seq. of the book.
38 See p. 145 of the book.
39 See p. 149 of the book.
40 See p. 151 of the book.
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of the book,  as there  are  no  obvious  connections  to the analysis  of legal
personhood  in case  of animals,  AI  or the unborn.  The chapter  focuses
on disorders of sex development and incongruence between biological sex
and  sex  assigned  at birth.  Instead  of that,  it  might  be  more  helpful
to provide  some summary,  resumé or final  remarks  on before-mentioned
knowledge, some recapitulation and drawing conclusions.
In conclusion,  the book  brings  together  general  knowledge  of legal
personhood and comprehensively examines various levels of humanity and
other entities. The way the book is structured into coherent – though quite
independent –  chapters  helps  to orientate  in individual  aspects
of the problematics  as well  as to essentially  illustrate  such  theoretical
material.  On the other  hand,  the division  into  distinct  chapters  impacts
the consistency of the text possibly caused by limited choose of legislations
of individual authors. It could benefit  from short conclusions tieing ideas
together between each part or as a final conclusion section. The book is very
valuable when dealing with the legal personhood in the theoretical essence
with emphasis on humanity, animals and unborn. However, the issue of AI
is not dealt with in an exhaustive manner, even though it should have been
one of the crucial  parts of the book according to its luring title. Individual
chapters  may  only  serve  as edification  of all  the  crucial  aspects  of legal
personhood which needed to bear in mind when talking about AI. The book
shall  be  thus  read by –  and recommended  to –  those  who  are  eager  for
deepening  of their  legal  personhood  knowledge  base  in the general  way
as well as from different angles. It may be helpful for those who are looking
for  a strong argumentation background. Unfortunately,  for those longing
for  further  AI  analysis,  the book  could  leave  them  simply  unsatisfied,
because  the problematics  of legal  personhood  in the case  of AI  could  be
analysed much more deeply.
